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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the literature of sovereign credit risk contagion by conducting a 
counterfactual analysis on credit risk spillovers among BRICS countries. The conditional value-
at-risk (CoVaR) methodology is used to this end. Moreover, the paper makes use of the 
generalised forecast error decomposition to assess the contribution of state variables in the 
CoVaR of each of the BRICS countries conditioned by China, the biggest economies of the 
BRICS. The findings of this paper show that credit risk distress in China affects the most all 
countries sovereign credit risk in the BRICS grouping. Moreover, the channel through which 
credit risk distress in China affect other BRICS country is not homogenous.      
 
 
1. Introduction 
Literature on sovereign credit risk spillover has resurged since the advent of the European 
sovereign debt crisis. The European sovereign debt crisis started in 2008 with the main trigger 
being the collapse of Iceland’s banking system. The crisis spilled over to Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal during 2009 and led to the collapse of their financial institution and the rapid increase in 
the yield spread of their government securities (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012). The crisis 
culminated in 2009 when it was revealed that Greece underreported its budget deficit to escape 
the guidelines set by the Maastricht treaty. The crisis spread in many Eurozone states as most of 
these states found it difficult to finance their budget deficit due to the high interest rates lenders 
demanded on Eurozone sovereign debt instruments. Although the contagion effects of the 
European sovereign debt crisis were evident in Eurozone states and worldwide, not all the states 
were affected the same way (Mink and De Haan, 2013). This reality shows that the contagion 
effects of the sovereign credit crisis, or any crisis for this matter, is not symmetrically distributed.   
  A number of studies attempts to assess the extent of contagion of the European sovereign debt 
crisis in Eurozone and worldwide. For example, Galarioti et al. (2016) examine the drivers of credit 
default swap (CDs) spreads and potential spillover effects for Eurozone countries during the 
European debt crisis. The authors make use of a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) model and 
find that the determinants of CDs variances neither are the same nor stable during different 
periods and in different Eurozone countries. For example, the authors find that the slope of the 
term structure affects differently the CDs spread variances in peripheral Eurozone countries such 
as Greece, Italy, Spain compared to core Eurozone countries such as France, Germany, 
Netherland and Belgium. Burietz and Ureche-Rangau (2016) make use of the game theory 
approach to show that Greek sovereign debt crisis created significant spillover risk for the other 
Eurozone economies. However, Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012), analysing the dynamics of credit 
default swaps of Greece, Spain and other countries, show that Greece has a lower ability to initiate 
the contagion effects of credit risk than core EU countries. Hałaj, Peltonen and Scheicher (2016) 
make use of both network tools and panel data analysis and find little evidence of the direct impact 
of the Greek sovereign debt crisis other Eurozone countries. The authors show that credit risk 
related to the risk of Greek sovereign debt causes temporary spillover effects on CDS spreads of 
other Eurozone countries. 
While literature on sovereign debt crisis contagion have focused mostly on developed economies, 
especially by considering developed economies as the source of contagion, very few studies focus 
on sovereign debt crisis contagion among emerging markets. For example, Kaminsky and 
Schmukler (2002) show that changes in sovereign debt rating in emerging economies directly 
impact on the markets of the countries rated in emerging economies and engender cross-country 
contagion. This contagion effect intensifies during periods of crisis. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, none of the studies has focused on assessing the effects of sovereign debt crisis or 
credit risk contagion among BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries. In 
addition, studies on sovereign credit risk contagion are often conducted a posteriori, i.e., contagion 
effects are assessed after the crisis has occurred (see Galarioti et al., 2016; Mink and De Haan, 
2013; Kalbaska and Gatkowski , 2012). However, this paper contributes to the literature of the 
sovereign credit risk contagion by conducting a counterfactual analysis on the possible effects of 
credit risk spillovers among BRICS countries. The CoVaR methodology is used to this end. 
Moreover, the paper makes use of the generalised forecast error decomposition to assess the 
contribution of state variables in the CoVaR of each of the BRICS countries conditioned by China, 
the biggest economies of the BRICS. The findings of this paper will allow assessing how much a 
distressed country within the BRICS grouping adds to the risk of peer countries in the grouping.  
Studying the sovereign credit risk contagion between BRICS countries is important given the 
magnitude of interaction between member countries and what the BRICS countries represent 
globally. The BRICS countries represent the world’s leading emerging market economies (EME), 
distinguished by their large, fast-growing economies. The growth potential of BRICS countries is 
informed by their diverse attributes. On one side, BRICS grouping includes resource-rich countries 
such as Brazil, South Africa and Russia. On the other side, BRICS comprises countries with huge 
manufacturing base and highly skilled workforce such as China and India. This diversity augur well 
for profitable exchanges among BRICS member states. Moreover, BRICS financial indicators are 
comparable to those of developed economies and the size of its stock exchange more than doubled 
between 1999 and 2009, and BRICS market capitalisation in stock markets grew from US$1.2 
trillion to US$6.4 trillion between 2000 and 2010 (New Delhi, 2012). The growing influence of 
BRICS financial markets offer an opportunity for asset managers to diversify their portfolio 
efficiently. However, this can occur only if asset managers and policy makers are well informed 
about the extent of cross-transmission of shocks in general and sovereign credit risk contagion in 
particular between BRICS countries. 
It is important to note that a number of factors contribute to credit risks in emerging market in 
general and BRICS in particular. Some of these factors include currency appreciation, risk 
premiums, liquidity squeeze and yield spread. Corte, Sarno, Scheniling and Wagner (2015) show 
most of the changes in sovereign credit risk, be it in developed and emerging markets,  are 
attributed to the change in the value of their currencies. These findings are also supported by 
Alexopoulou et al. (2009) who apply an error correction model and find that exchange rate along 
with yield spread play a fundamental role in determining the cost of borrowing for the sovereign 
hence impacting on credit riskiness of the country. A study conducted by Saadaoui and Boujelbene 
(2007) finds that liquidity squeeze is a significant variable in determining credit risk of emerging 
markets. They further assert that liquidity is one of the most crucial factors in the gradual 
improvement of sovereign bond markets in emerging markets. Özatay et al. (2009) suggest that 
credit ratings play a fundamental role in influencing sovereign credit risk of emerging markets. 
Gonzalez-Rozada and Yeyati (2008) support these results with their own study, which finds that a 
negative rating from rating agency S&P significantly increases the sovereign credit risk of more 
than 30 developing and emerging markets. Credit rating agencies such as Fitch, S&P and Moody’s 
offer ratings that evaluate a country’s ability to meet its debt obligations by mainly focusing on 
socio and macroeconomic indicators. South Africa has recently been downgraded by two of the 
three largest rating agencies because of poor short term to medium term growth prospects and an 
increasing government debt. The downgrade implies a reduction in the creditworthiness of South 
Africa and an increase in the nation’s credit risk. In September 2017, China the biggest BRICS 
economy also got a downgrade on its sovereign debt because of a continued increase in the 
country’s debt. However, unlike South Africa, China’s economic outlook is forecasted to be stable 
even though they have been downgraded. While these credit ratings might not be taken seriously 
in China, which rarely depends on external funding, for South Africa whose access to sources of 
funding is uncertain hence these ratings should play a significant role. Unfortunately, there is no 
literature that has ever assessed the contagion effects of sovereign credit risk among BRICS 
economies. 
CoVaRj/i  denotes the value at risk (VaR) of an institution j , or a set of institutions, conditional 
on some events occurring to institution i  (Andrian and Brunnemeier, 2016). In the context of this 
paper the CoVaR methodology will provide insights on how the value at risk of a specific BRICS 
country, or a set of countries, will be affected conditional on the rising of sovereign credit risk in 
another BRICS country. The CoVaR methodology as applied in this paper will not only contribute 
to assess the extent of sovereign credit risk transmission or contagion but will also provide a 
counterfactual analysis for an ex ante policy evaluation. The remainder of the paper is divided as 
follows; section 2 presents the methodology used in the paper, section 3 discusses the data used, 
estimate the model and discusses the results, Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2. Methodology 
This section presents the methodology used in this study.  It shows how the CoVaR is modelled, 
mainly by making use of the quantile regression when estimating the value-at-risk related to 
sovereign credit risk.    
2.1. CoVaR Definition 
Given Yt , the returns of a bond for example,  we can statistically define the VaR of a bond as the 
q quantile of the distribution of its returns over the confidence level 1-q. This can be represented 
as follows 
Pr(𝑌𝑡
𝑖 ≤ 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡,𝑞
𝑖 ) = 𝑞                                                                                                   (1) 
Where itY  represents the returns of a bond in country i and 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡,𝑞
𝑖  is the q percent value at risk 
for country i. 
Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) define CoVaR as the Value-at-Risk of the system given that one 
institution is already at its VaR. In the context of this study, CoVaR would mean the extent of the 
exposure to credit risk by some of the BRICS countries when one of the BRICS country is in 
distress (exposed to credit risk). Hence, the concept of CoVaR is statistically defined as the qth 
quantile of a country’s returns’ distribution on condition that the returns of another individual 
country are equal to the VaR. This can be represented as follows: 
Pr(𝑌𝑡
𝑗 ≤ 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡,𝑞
𝑗|𝑖
|𝑌𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡,𝑞
𝑖 ) = 𝑞                                                                             (2) 
Where jtY  are the returns of the country j at time t and 
i
tY  are the returns of country I at time t. 
2.2. Estimation Procedure 
CoVaR makes use of value-at-risk (VaR) as the basic measure for risk. It is often used to assess 
the extent of risk contagion between countries or institutions. Given that VaR is often obtained 
by making use of the quantile regression (see Gaglianone, et al., 2011 ; Taylor, 2008) , it is 
understandable that the first step in estimating CoVaR requires the use of quantile regression to 
determine the lowest quantile, which represents situations of distress. Thus, in the case of this 
paper, we estimate sovereign credit risk for each of the BRICS country, proxied by the change in 
the sovereign yields, at q= 5% quantile making use of the following equation: 
  𝑌𝑡,𝑞
𝑖 = 𝛽0,𝑞
𝑖 + 𝛽1,𝑞
𝑖 𝑀𝑡 + ɛ𝑡
𝑖                                                                                                         (3) 
Where Mt represents the set of states variables or possible determinants of sovereign credit risk.  
In the second step, we calculate the VaR of the individual countries from the predicted values of 
Equation 3. 
After estimating the VaR of country i we then estimate the CoVaR of  country j. the CoVar of 
country j is obtained by controlling each of the VaR of country j with different state variables and 
the VaR of country i. The expression is represented as: 
𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡,𝑞
𝑗|𝑖
= 𝛽0,𝑞
?̂? + 𝛽1,𝑞
?̂? 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡,𝑞
𝑖 + 𝛽2,𝑞
?̂? 𝑀𝑡                                                                                  (4) 
Where 𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡,𝑞
𝑖  is the value-at-risk of country i . 
It is worth noting that Equation 4 makes use of the predicted values or out-of-sample estimation 
of the estimated CoVaR of country j.   
Given that the aim of this paper is  to assess the extent of contagion of sovereign credit risk among 
BRICS countries, this is achieved by estimating Delta CoVaR ( )CoVaR , which is the difference 
between the CoVaR of country j when country i is in distress and the CoVaR of country j when 
country i is in normal state.  ∆CoVaR  provides a tool to assess how a risk of an institution or 
country changes when a particular institution or country becomes financially stressed. It is then 
used to measure the extent of risk contagion between countries or institutions. ∆COVaR is 
represented as follows: 
∆𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡,𝑞
𝑠|𝑖
= 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡,𝑞
𝑠|𝑖=𝑉𝑎𝑅
− 𝐶𝑜𝑉𝑎𝑅𝑡,𝑞
𝑠|𝑖=𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙
         (5) 
 3. Data, Estimation and Results 
3.1. Data 
In analysing  the extent of contagion of sovereign credit risk between BRICS countries, this paper  
considers daily benchmark yields for ten-year government bonds for Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa with the sample spanning from March 2008 to May 2017. The sample includes 
periods of major financial crises such as the global financial crisis and European debt crisis, thus, 
providing a valuable opportunity to assess sovereign risk contagion among BRICS countries during 
tumultuous periods.  
Typically, credit default swaps (CDS) spreads data are often used in the literature to measure credit 
risk. Because of data unavailability for some of the BRICS countries we opted to use  bonds yields, 
which may also be used to proxy credit risk and ,  have been proven to produce the same results 
as the CDs spreads (see  Lange, Lucas and Siegmann, 2016).. 
In implementing quantile regression for VaR and CoVaR estimation1, we follow Afonso et al., 
(2012 )and Wong and Fong (2011) by making  use of a set of   important variables  that influence 
sovereign bond yields, namely the business cycle (YSPRE), liquidity squeeze (LIQS), global risk 
premium (RISKP)and currency fluctuation (CURR).  . The business cycle is proxied by the yield 
spread between each country’s 10-year government bond and the three -month Treasury bill. 
Liquidity squeeze is calculated by taking the difference between the repo rate and 3-month 
Treasury bill. The difference between the MSCI world index return and 3 month US Treasury bill 
proxies the global risk premium and the change in the exchange rate between the countries in 
question’s currency and the US dollar represents the currency appreciation/depreciation.  
Figure 1 presents the display of the bond yields for the five BRICS countries. The figure shows 
that during the sample period considered by the paper, the yields of China did not change much 
and were constantly the lowest in the BRICS block. Brazil records the highest yield on average 
among BRICS countries. It is important to note the highest yield of Brazil’s government bond 
should be attributed to the high level of its government debt GDP reaching 74.04% in 2017.2 
Another salient feature of Figure 1 is that the bond yields of all the BRICS countries increased 
during the 2008 global financial crisis except those of China that have remained relatively flat 
during the period 2008-2017. The noticeable increase in government bond yield for Russia in 2014 
                                                          
1 See Equations 3 and 4. 
2 Statistics provided by Trading Economics, available at http//tradingeconomics.com 
reflects the consequences of international sanctions imposed on Russia following its military 
intervention in Ukraine with the yield in government bond reaching 16.05% in January 2015 from 
a low of 8.46% in June 2014. Moreover, Figure 1 shows a spike in government bond yield in 2015 
in Brazil. This is due to the economic crisis in the country due to political paralysis that culminated 
to the impeachment of President Roussef. The economic crisis affected investors’ confidence and 
led to the increase in the yield in government bond reaching 16.85% in September 2015.  
Figure 1: Bond Yields 
 
 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics for the change in bond yields. It is worth noting that the 
change in bond yield should approximate the returns of government bonds given the negative 
relationship between bond yields and bond prices. The results reported in Table 1 show that the 
means of the yield changes of government bonds is negative for all the BRICS countries. Given 
the negative relationship between bond yields and bond prices, the negative sign reflects the 
increase in bond prices and positive returns for all the BRICS countries bonds during the period 
2008 – 2017. Russia and Brazil have the highest standard deviation of government bond yields. 
This is confirmed with the display in Figure 1 showing higher volatility of the yields of the two 
countries. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Bond Yield Changes 
  Brazil China India RSA Russia 
Mean -0,0058 -0,0026 -0,0046 -0,0013 -0,0012 
St. dv 0,5974 0,5537 0,3677 0,4164 1,2607 
Kurtosis 15,9417 7,4359 29,0783 13,4258 34,403 
Skewness 0,3571 -0,4185 1,1388 1,2818 1,6048 
Minimum -5,3070 -3,3334 -2,5858 -2,4230 -10,073 
Maximum 6,8430 3,1671 5,3145 4,9209 16,452 
 
 
3.2. CoVaR estimation and Results 
Using quantile regression, we estimated the CoVaR at the 95 percent confidence level for each 
BRICS country’s sovereign debt market by making use of Equation 4.  Table 3 reports the results 
of the delta CoVaR, as in Equation 5, for all BRICS countries. As stated earlier, Delta CoVaR 
measures how much a distressed country adds to the risk of a peer country when it moves form 
operating normally to being in a state of distress. In Table 3, column 1 indicates how much Brazil 
adds to the credit risk of the other four countries. For example, the results reported in Table 1 
show that when Brazil enters a state of distress it increases the risk in Russia by 16.4 percent 
(0.164), whilst it adds 7, 8 and 13 percent to China, India and South Africa respectively. The 
findings mean that the Brazil will be the most affected whereas China will be least affected when 
Russia’s sovereign debt markets malfunctions. A look at column 2 shows that the results are not 
symmetric as a distressed Russia only adds 1.4 percent to the credit risk Brazil, making Brazil the 
least vulnerable country to a distressed Russia. South Africa, the smallest economy in the BRICS 
grouping, is on average the most affected countries by credit risk contagion from other BRICS 
countries. For example, the results of the net mutual contagion show that Brazil increases the 
credit risk contagion to South Africa by close to 14%, while credit risk in Brazil augments by 4.4% 
when South Africa is in distress. Distress in China affects the most all countries in the BRICS 
grouping. For example, distress in China increases sovereign credit risk in India by close to 23.5% 
while distress in India changes credit risk in China by 19%. The finding that China is the most 
influential countries in the BRICS grouping in term of sovereign credit risk contagion is supported 
by many studies. For example, Bonga-Bonga (2017) finds that there is an asymmetric influence 
among BRICS countries with in term of the cross transmission of shocks with China being the 
most influential BRIKCS country.    
Table 3: Delta CoVaR 
  Brazil Russia India China 
South 
Africa 
Brazil   0,014076 0,02044 0,188607 0,044437 
Russia 0,164796   0,141655 0,179624 0,048243 
India 0,086232 0,047863   0,235327 0,107268 
China 0,078128 0,079715 0,178661   0,04868 
South 
Africa 0,139177 0,227491 0,189192 0,124221   
Average 0,117083 0,092286 0,132487 0,181945 0,062157 
 
In table 3, the last row shows how much on average the risk of the other economies increases 
when one economy is in distress. On average China will increase the risk of other BRICS countries 
by 18 percent when in distress. This figure also proves to be the largest among the averages, 
meaning that China has the largest significant effect on the other economies.  
3.3. Variance Decomposition 
The results reported in Table 3 show that China has the largest potential to transmit sovereign 
credit risk to other BRICS countries. However, it is important to assess the extent to which each 
variables3 contribute to this contagion. It is in that context that this sub-section intends to analyse 
the impact of the innovation to each variables on the credit risk transmitted by China to other 
BRICS countries.  The paper makes use of the generalised forecast error variance decomposition 
to this end (see Pesaran and Shin, 1998).   
 
Figure 2 shows that in the short-term 18 percent of the variance of conditional credit risk 
transmitted by China to South Africa  are attributed to shocks to liquidity squeeze whereas  shock 
to  risk premium accounts for around 11 percent in explaining the variation of the conditional risk 
transmitted by China. This finding implies that liquidity squeeze accounts for the most part in the 
                                                          
3 We focus on  the states variables that determine the COVAR as in Equation 4, namely, liquidity squeeze, 
risk premium, credit rating and currency fluctuation 
fluctuation of the conditional credit risk contagion in South Africa. Over the long horizon liquidity 
squeeze continues to dominate as an important contributor to the conditional credit risk 
transmitted from China to South Africa.  This finding shows that when China’s sovereign credit 
market is in turmoil, there is a likelihood that other emerging market such as South Africa will be 
impacted negatively through sharp sell-off in their equity and bond markets. The dollar liquidity 
squeeze that ensues is often due to massive foreign capital outflow from these markets.  
 
Figure 2.   Variance Decomposition of conditional credit risk transmitted from China to 
South Africa  
 
 
Figure 3 shows that innovation to global risk premium contributes the most to the variation of 
credit risk transmitted by China to Brazil. Although the global risk premium continues to dominate 
as the largest contributor to shocks to credit, risk contagion from China, however, the contribution 
of the business cycle increases over time.  The rationale behind this finding is that sovereign credit 
risk crisis in China should fuel global risk premium and given the  susceptibility of Brazil to global 
risk premium (Dungey, et al., 2006), it is evident that innovation to global risk premium should 
become an important channel through which sovereign credit crisis in China is transmitted to 
Brazil. 
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Figure 2.   Variance Decomposition of conditional credit risk transmitted from China to 
Brazil 
 
 
Figure 4 shows that innovation to liquidity squeeze and business cycle contribute the most to the 
variation of credit risk transmitted by china to Russia. A number of studies find that China’s 
business cycle converges with that of a number of emerging markets, especially Russia, due to their 
increase in trade (See Calderon, 2008 and Cesa-Bianchi, 2012). It is evident that the occurrence of 
credit crisis in China will affect the country’s business cycle. Thus, the business cycle should 
become an important channel through which credit risk in China is transmitted to Russia.  
Figure 4.   Variance Decomposition of conditional credit risk transmitted from China to 
Russia 
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Figure 5 show that like in the case of Russia, innovation to liquidity squeeze and business cycle 
contribute the most to the variation of credit risk transmitted by china to India. This shows that 
the comovement of the business cycle between China and India is an important source of shock 
transmission. Moreover, like in the case of South Africa where liquidity squeeze is an important 
channel of shock transmission to credit risk, it is important to infer that when China’s sovereign 
credit market is in turmoil, there is a likelihood that India will be impacted negatively through 
sharp sell-off in their equity and bond markets.  
 
Figure 5.   Variance Decomposition of conditional credit risk transmitted from China to 
India 
 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
This paper assessed the extent of sovereign credit risk spillover among BRICS countries. In fact, 
the paper examined how a sovereign credit risk that emanates in one of the BRICS countries 
transmit to other BRICS countries. The paper makes use of the CoVaR methodology to this end. 
The results of the empirical analysis show that China has the largest potential to affect the 
sovereign credit risk of other BRICS countries. . For example, credit risk distress in China increases 
sovereign credit risk in India by close to 23.5% while distress in India changes credit risk in China 
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only by 19%. Moreover, the paper analyses the impact of the innovation to each variables on the 
credit risk transmitted by China to other BRICS countries. The results show that the extent of the 
contribution of the main variables to sovereign credit risk transmitted by China varies according 
to specific BRICS countries. For example, the results that innovation to liquidity squeeze and 
business cycle contribute the most to the variation of credit risk transmitted by china to Russia. 
While innovation to global risk premium contributes the most to the variation of credit risk 
transmitted by China to Brazil.  
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